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IN THE PROCEDURAL SURROUNDINGS
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, THE ADVERSARIAL PRINCIPLE,
AND TENDENCIES TOWARD SETTLEMENT*
by
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The article  builds on a pluralistic  perspective on law and the understanding that
legal  research must take  into account the procedural  and institutional landscape
where legal rights are enforced. In relation to online dispute resolution (ODR), two
procedural mechanisms, namely the adversarial principle and the tendency toward
settlements,  are  studied  and  discussed.  The adversarial  principle  (argued  to be
integral to most ODR procedures) and tendencies toward settlements (also argued
to be  integral  to most  ODR  procedures)  are  considered  in relation
to the overarching (and possibly contradictory) objectives of protecting individual
consumer rights and the interest of increasing economic efficiency within the EU’s
internal market.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Within European consumer law, the European Commission has been working
actively  for  a number  of years  to resolve  disputes  in consumer  cases
through alternative dispute resolution formats. The efforts have been based
on the key  words  simplicity,  proportionality,  justice,  and  efficiency,  and
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the method is  alternative  dispute  resolution  (ADR),  and in  a digital  setting
online dispute resolution (ODR).1 The sector in which ODR is expected to have
an impact is immense. In the EU, consumer transactions account for more
than 50 percent of the total gross domestic product.2 About half of all EU
consumers  regularly  shop  over  the Internet,  and  online  sales  are  also
the fastest growing type of sales in the EU.3
The most  common legal  conflicts  related to consumer  trade are  what
most  people  consider  everyday  legal  types  of conflicts  such  as delivery
delays, damaged products, and products that do not arrive at all.4 Dispute
resolution in consumer-related disputes, both through court and alternative
processes,  however, is  anything but  an everyday issue.  Rather, consumer
processes  are  unusual  and  only  two  percent  of all  EU  consumers  who
believe  they  have  a reason to target  a business  continue  on to some type
of dispute  resolution  procedure.  Studies  show  that  even  companies  are
cautious  about  using  the court  as a forum for  consumer  disputes.5 Thus,
there  is  a widespread  reluctance  to take  conflicts  that  arise  as a result
of consumer  consumption  to judicial  institutions.  For  disputes  of lesser
value, procedures that require the parties to meet face to face are simply not
an option,  especially  in cross-border  situations.6 In addition,  the methods
of ordinary  dispute  resolution  are  quite  varied  and,  in most  cases,  very
cumbersome.7
Consumer protection within the EU is ensured by means of mandatory
rules  that  strengthen  the position  of the consumer.  Signals  from  among
others the  Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)  indicate that these
1 Cortés, P. (2017a) The Law of Consumer Redress in an Evolving Digital Market: Upgrading from
Alternative to Online Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. viii.
2 European  Commission.  (2012)  Communication  from  the commission  to the European
Parliament,  The Council,  The Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the Committee
of the Regions:  A European  consumer  agenda –  Boosting  confidence  and  growth.
COM(2012) 225 final, p. 1.
3 Cortés, P. (2017a) The Law of Consumer Redress in an Evolving Digital Market: Uppgrading from
Alternative to Online Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4–5.
4 Ibid.
5 European  Commission.  (2011)  Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  Impact  Assessment
Accompanying  the document  Proposal  for  a Directive  of the European  Parliament  and
of the Council  on Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  for  consumer  disputes  (Directive
on consumer  ADR)  and  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and
of the Council  on Online  Dispute  Resolution  for  consumer  disputes  (Regulation
on consumer ODR). SEC(2011) 1408 final, p. 13.
6 Cortés, P. (2017a) The Law of Consumer Redress in an Evolving Digital Market: Upgrading from
Alternative to Online Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2–4.
7 Commission staff working paper, p. 13.
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rights are to be upheld ex officio by court officials across the EU.8 However,
since  a very  low number  of conflicts  between consumers  and companies
reach court proceedings, there is no forum, i.e. no institutional context, for
actual  enforcement  of consumer  protection.  This  is  where  the ADR  and
ODR  initiatives  are  supposed  to present  an option.  To enable  easily
accessible  and  efficient  out-of-court  redress  for  consumer  disputes,
including disputes arising from cross-border e-commerce, an extensive legal
framework on ADR and ODR was adopted at EU level in 2013 and has been
in place since 2016. The ODR as an initiative has its origin in the notion that
civil  courts  for  many  years  have  failed  to provide  access  to justice  for
ordinary  individuals.9 The idea  behind the initiative  is  to give consumers
access  to a comprehensive  landscape  of ADR  bodies.  By doing  this
the Commission is hopeful that consumers will be able to solve disputes with
companies  that  arise  from  online  transactions  in  a simple,  fast,  and
inexpensive way, while companies avoid costly litigation procedures and
maintain good customer relations. In addition to this,  it is also outspoken
that  ODR  considers  the interest  of increasing  economic  efficiency  within
the internal  market.10 The importance  of the ODR  framework
as a contributor  to economic  growth  has  been  manifestly  held  forth
by the Commission.11
The two  legislative  instruments  comprising  the described  framework,
the ADR  Directive  and  the ODR  Regulation,  are  interlinked  and
complementary.12 The online  dispute  resolution  platform  (the ODR
8 See, e.g. Judgement of 27 June 2000, Joined Cases Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano
Quintero  and  Salvat  Editores  SA  v Jose  M.  Sanchez  Alcón  Prades  and  Others,  C-240/98
to C-244/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:346, and Judgement of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsebet
Sustikne Gyorf, C-243/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350.
9 Cortés makes this point referring to Lord Justice Briggs.  See Cortés,  P.  (2017b) The Online
Court: Filling the Gaps of the Civil Justice System?  Civil Justice Quarterly, 36, pp. 109–126,
p. 109.
10 Cortés, P. (2017a) The Law of Consumer Redress in an Evolving Digital Market: Upgrading from
Alternative  to Online  Dispute  Resolution. Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  p. 2.
The ODR platform is supposed to contribute to strengthening consumers’ and companies’
confidence in shopping and trading online both in their country and abroad.
11 European  Commission.  (2012)  Communication  from  the commission  to the European
Parliament,  The Council,  The Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the Committee
of the Regions:  A European  consumer  agenda –  Boosting  confidence  and  growth.
COM(2012) 225 final, p. 1.
12 Directive  2013/11/EU  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 21  May  2013
on alternative  dispute  resolution  for  consumer  disputes  and amending  Regulation  (EC)
No 2006/2004  and  Directive  2009/22/EC  (Directive  on consumer  ADR),  Regulation  (EU)
No 524/2013  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 21  May  2013  on online
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and
Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) (2013).
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platform) – a website that channels complaints to ADR bodies – is the central
node for the out-of-court framework that has been established. These ADR
bodies  (sometimes  ODR  entities)  have  been  notified  to the Commission
by national  authorities  and  must  pass  an assessment  of their  compliance
with  the quality  requirements  mandated  in the ADR/ODR  legal
framework.13 A large  number  of ADR  bodies  have  been  registered
on the ODR platform since  its  launch.  More  than 300  ADR bodies  from
26 member states can currently be accessed through the platform. The ADR
bodies  are  complemented  with  designated  national  ODR  contact  points
where consumers can receive assistance with how to use the platform.14
In light  of the current  reforms,  a reasonable  question  to ask  is  how
the objective  of creating  “easily  accessible  and  efficient  out-of-court  redress”
relates to other important principles and institutional considerations within
the field  of consumer  redress.  The present  article  focuses  on procedural
considerations  regarding  ODR.  In order  to understand  the consequences
of the ADR  and  ODR  initiatives,  there  is  a need  for  an assessment  that
includes  the procedural  mechanisms  that  contribute  to the enforcement
of the legal norms at stake. This article will discuss two such mechanisms,
namely the adversarial principle and the tendency toward settlements. The aim
is  to address  how the adversarial  principle  (argued to be integral to most
ODR  procedures)  and  tendencies  toward  settlements  (also  argued  to be
integral  to most  ODR  procedures)  affect  the overarching  idea  of ODR
as a tool  to enforce  consumer  legislation.  The article  does  not  strive
to criticize  the system  as such  or to present  ideas  for  reforms,  but  rather
attempts  to explore  the procedural  landscape  where  consumer  redress  is
currently prioritized.
The institutional  context  where  ODR  takes  place  could  be  described
as pluralistic.  ODR exists  in an institutional  environment with public  and
private  bodies  (some  of which  are  profit  driven)  that  utilize  a variety
of techniques  including  meditation,  arbitration,  and  ombudsman.15
In addition,  there are different  levels  of technology (sometimes including
advanced  automated  and  assisted  negotiation)  involved  in the digital
13 European  Commission.  (2017)  Report  from  the Commission  to the European  Parliament
and  the Council  on the functioning  of the European  Online  Dispute  Resolution  platform
established under Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer
disputes COM(2017) 744 final, (2017) p. 1.
14 Op. cit., p. 4.
15 Schlote, J. A. (2017) Polycentrism and Democracy in Internet Governance. In: Uta Kohl (ed.).
The Net and the Nation State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 165–184, p. 167.
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interfaces available through the ODR platform.16 Following the by now old
idea that pluralism in fact should be followed by pluralism in norm/theory,
this article takes its point of departure in pluralistic legal theory, which will
be presented below.17
Discussions  concerning  tendencies  toward  settlements  (and  critique
thereof)  as well  as discussions  on the consequences  of the adversarial
principle,  within  different  kinds  of litigation,  are  certainly  not  new.
Arguments and concerns about settlements in legal settings have already
been put forth within the field of ODR.18 Also the adversarial principle have
been  discussed  previously,  at least  considering  the broader  subject
of ADR.19 However,  as already  mentioned,  the aim  of this  article  is  not
to critique  these  concepts,  or the ODR platform or different  ODR entities,
per se.  Instead, the article  is  rooted in the idea that in order to understand
consumer litigation within the ODR framework, there is a need for theory
and  research  concerning  the institutional  and  procedural  context
of the ODR platform. The article aims at contributing to this by addressing
how the adversarial  principle  and  settlements  affect  the underlying
landscape of consumer litigation through ODR.
The overarching  aim  of the article  will  be  fulfilled  by examining  two
ODR platforms in more detail,  the German ODR entity  General  Consumer
Arbitration  Board,  Center  for  Mediation  (Allgemeine  Verbraucher-
-schlichtungsstelle  Zentrum  für  Schlichtung,  AVZS)  and  the Swedish  ODR
entity  National Board for Consumer Disputes (Allmänna reklamationsnämnden,
ARN).  These  ODR  entities  have  been  chosen  as both  of them  deal  with
a large number of cases every year and because they have a quite similar
(prima facie) internal structure. They will  be use in order to illustrate how
the adversarial  principle  (and  below,  the tendencies  toward  settlement)
forms  an integral  part  of the ODR  entities  and  co-produces  the outcome
of the proceedings.  The two  ODR  bodies  are  similar  in most  regards.
However,  for  ARN,  the  main  rule  is  that  the Board  gives  a proposal
16 Cortés, P. (2017a) The Law of Consumer Redress in an Evolving Digital Market: Upgrading from
Alternative to Online Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 44–52.
17 Rosenfeld,  M.  (1998)  Just  interpretations:  Law  between  ethics  and  politics.  Santa  Monica:
University of California Press, 1998, p. 200.
18 See Eidenmüller,  H.  and Engel,  M.  (2014)  Against  False  Settlement:  Designing  Efficient
Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe.  Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution,
29 (2), p. 261–298.
19 See,  e.g. Wagner,  G.  (2014)  Private  Law  Enforcement  Through  ADR:  Wonder  Drug
Or Snake Oil. Common Market Law Review, 5, p. 165–194.
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to the parties  and settlement  is  an exception  to this  rule.  For  AVZS,  it  is
the other way around.
2. CONSUMER ODR AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
WITHIN THE EU
Before  moving  on to the theoretical  foundation  for  this  article  and
the substantial  discussions  on the adversarial  principle  and  settlements,
a few words  should  be  said  about  consumer  protection  in EU countries.
Consumer legislation has been a priority for many decades within the EU.
Article 169 (1)  and  subsection  (a)  of Article 169 (2)  of the Treaty
on the Functioning  of the European  Union  (TFEU) provide  that  the Union  is
to contribute  to the attainment  of a high  level  of consumer  protection
through  measures  adopted  pursuant  to Article 114  TFEU.  Similarly,
Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides
that  Union  policies  are  to ensure  a high  level  of consumer  protection.
In accordance with Article 26 (2) TFEU, the internal market is to comprise
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods and
services  is  ensured.  The internal  market  should  provide  consumers  with
added value in the form of better quality, greater variety, reasonable prices,
and high safety standards for goods and services,  which should promote
a high level of consumer protection.20
Consumer protection is  highlighted in the first  paragraphs of the ADR
Directive and the ODR Regulation. These provisions state that the purpose
of the Directive  and the Regulation is  to achieve a high level  of consumer
protection  and to contribute  to the proper  functioning  of the internal
market.21 According  to the preamble  of the ADR  Directive,  resolutions
emanating  from  ADR  (including  ODR)  should  not  result  in a consumer
being
20 European  Commission.  (2012)  Communication  from  the commission  to the European
Parliament,  The Council,  The Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the Committee
of the Regions:  A European  consumer  agenda –  Boosting  confidence  and  growth.
COM(2012) 225 final, p. 2.
21 Directive  2013/11/EU  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 21  May  2013
on alternative  dispute  resolution  for  consumer  disputes  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)
No 2006/2004  and  Directive  2009/22/EC  (Directive  on consumer  ADR).  And  Regulation,
'Regulation  (EU)  No 524/2013  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 21  May
2013 on online dispute  resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR).
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“deprived of the protection afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be
derogated  from  by agreement  by virtue  of the law  of the Member  State
in which the consumer is habitually resident.”22 
Furthermore,  the rights  to an effective  remedy  and  to a fair  trial  are
fundamental  rights  laid  down  in Article  47  of the Charter  of Fundamental
Rights  of the European  Union.  Therefore,  ADR  procedures  should  not  be
designed to replace  court  procedures  and should not  deprive  consumers
or businesses of their rights to seek redress before the courts. In cases where
a dispute  could  not  be  resolved through a given  ADR procedure  whose
outcome is not binding, the parties should subsequently not be prevented
from initiating judicial proceedings in relation to that dispute.23
The protection  of consumer  rights  in relation  to national  procedural
institutions has been discussed by the CJEU in several cases, with the clear
signal  that  national  courts  should  play  an active  part  in protecting
consumer  rights.24 The cases  are  not  specifically  concerned  with  ODR
entities, but are quite relevant to the field since they deal with the effective
protection of consumers redress through national institutions. In cases such
as Océano,  Mostaza  Claro,  and  Pannon, the CJEU  stated  that  unfair
prorogation  clauses  must  be  set  aside  by the court  regardless  of whether
this  is  argued  by the consumer  and  that  national  courts  should  make
ex officio  efforts to guarantee consumer rights.25 In Duarte Hueros, the CJEU
held  that  a consumer  not  getting  a price  reduction  constituted
an infringement of the principle of effectiveness, even though the consumer
had not claimed a price reduction in the court process. 26 In Pénzügyi Lízing,
the CJEU considered it a responsibility of the national court to take an active
part in investigating whether consumer rights have been violated.27
22 Directive on consumer ADR, preamble § 44.
23 Directive on consumer ADR, preamble § 45.
24 For  deeper  analysis  on this  matter  see,  e.g. [forthcoming]  Wallerman,  A.  (2019)
Manoeuvring Procedural Autonomy In Sweden: Is Materielle Prozessleitung the Answer?
In:  Anna  Nylund  and  Bart  Krans  (ed.).  Procedural  autonomy:  Room  for  manoeuvre?
Cambridge: Intersentia.
25 Judgement  of 27  June  2000,  Joined  Cases,Oceano  Grupo  Editorial  SA  v Roció  Murciano
Quintero  and  Salvat  Editores  SA  v Jose  M.  Sanchez  Alcón  Prades  and  Others,  C-240/98
to C-244/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:346,  Judgement  of 26  October  2006,  Mostaza  Claro v Centro
Móvil Milenium SL,  C-168/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:675  and Judgement of 4 June 2009,  Pannon
GSM Zrt. v Erzsebet Sustikne Gyorf, C-243/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350.
26 Judgement of 3 October 2013,  Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA och Automóviles Citroen
Espana SA, C-32/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:637.
27 Judgement of 6 July 2010,  VB Penzugyi Lizing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider, C-137/08, ECLI:EU:C:
2010:659.
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The case law presented here indicates a strong responsibility for national
institutions  to act  ex  officio.  Nevertheless,  the CJEU  has  also  highlighted
the importance  of ADR.  In the Alassini case,  where  Italian  legislation
demanded that the consumer tried an out-of-court procedure before turning
to a court, the CJEU approved of such a legislation, insofar as it ensures that
out-of-court procedures are systematically used for settling disputes, and
since  it is  designed  to strengthen the EU  consumer  legislation  at stake.28
In sum,  the CJEU  stresses  the importance  of national  procedural  law
strengthening the position of the consumer but also seems to be open to this
being done through ADR proceedings (e.g. via the ODR platform).
3. PLURALISM AS A THEORETICAL TOOL FOR ODR 
RESEARCH
Legal  pluralism  as a theoretical  concept  has  many  dimensions,  which
in turn can be said to target different aspects of ODR.
Firstly,  pluralism  comes  with  a theoretical  baggage.  To get  a grasp
of the theories  behind  pluralism,  the following  words  by Davis  are
illustrative: 
“All  normativity is  produced by interactions between human agents  who
are not abstract individuals with unattached free wills, but rather already
situated  in diverse  contexts  of social  meaning.  Normativity  (including
anything  termed  “legal”)  is  therefore  necessarily  constructed  and
reconstructed across these discursive environments by virtue of the fact that
agents circulate between them. Norms and the “systems” attributed to them
are therefore not closed and stable but intrinsically open and contingent.”29
This  entails  that  in order  to understand  how  ODR  might  function,
the contingent expression of ODR must be studied. Furthermore, all aspects
of the institutional  context  of ODR  are  potentially  legally  relevant.  This
means  that  a large  number  of considerations  besides  the  ones  discussed
28 Judgement of 18 March 2010, Joined Cases, Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08),
Filomena  Califano  v Wind  SpA  (C-318/08),  Lucia  Anna  Giorgia  Iacono  v Telecom  Italia  SpA
(C-319/08)  and Multiservice  Srl  v Telecom Italia  SpA (C-320/08)  Par 45,  C-317/08,  C-318/08,
C-319/08 and C-320/08.
29 Davies,  M.  (2010)  Legal  Pluralism.  In:  Peter  Cane and Herbert  Kritzer  (ed.).  The Oxford
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 805–827, 823.
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in this  article  could  (and  should)  be  addressed  in order  to understand
the relevant context for legal studies of ODR.30
The pluralistic  theoretical  view requires the researcher to pay attention
to the procedural framework where consumer rights are (supposedly) made
efficient.  The relationship,  and  potential  discrepancies,  between
an individual consumer right and a settled ODR procedure then inevitably
become  a focus  of interest;  e.g. does  an ODR  settlement  mean  that
an individual  consumer  right  has  been  enforced,  and  do  possible
transformations occur when a substantive legal act is situated in a specific
institutional context?
Secondly,  pluralism invites  legal  scholarship  to consider  how different
disciplines/fields  of law  work  together  and  how  norms  from  different
systems support or counteract each other. In this particular article, the focus
of interest connects several fields of law, especially consumer protection law
in relation to procedural law. In the examples discussed below, it must be
considered that the ODR platform, enacted under Article 169 of TFEU, co-
-exists  with  mandatory  consumer  legislation  and  general  (national)
procedural principles.
Thirdly,  the general  understanding  of pluralism  strives  to take  into
account  all  potentially  legally relevant  institutional  factors.  This  includes
the study of potential parallel systems for consumer protection legislation
in the absence  of a clear  path  for  consumer  cases  to the supreme  court
(i.e. the CJEU).  It  has  been  argued  in the ODR  literature  that  paths
to the general  court  system  should  not  be  hindered, but  the question  is
whether  there  exists  a functional route  in the nitty  gritty  legal  practice.
The so-called  “individual  complaint  journey”  will  in few  instances  lead
to court  and,  in very  few  situations,  find  its  way  to the CJEU.
“Ombudsprudence” has  already  been  coined.31 Furthermore
the institutional  environment  also  invites  the well  explored  discussion
on how  technology  forms  and  transforms  the consumer  protection
enforcement via various technological tools.32 
Fourthly,  pluralism  could  also  be  considered  on a more  formal  level
concerning  the competence  to issue  legal  norms  relevant  for  ODR.  EU
member state competence regarding civil  procedure, EU initiatives under
30 Studies concerning the technological dimensions and their consequences of ODR included.
31 Stüner,  M.  (2014)  ADR  and  Adjucation  by State  Courts:  Competitors  or Complements?
Grundfragen, 3, pp. 122–128, 127.
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Article  169  of the TFEU,  guiding  procedural  principles  deriving  from
the European  Convention  of Human  Rights  (ECHR),  and  Article 47
of the Charter  of Fundamental  Rights  (ECFR)  are examples  of how different
legal  institutions  with  different  but  overlapping  competences  all  have
normative influence over ODR.33
It is safe to assume that legal research rooted in legal pluralism, as it has
been  presented  here,  becomes  very  complicated.  All  relevant  contexts
cannot be addressed at once, and furthermore, the pluralistic perspectives
deconstruct  the idea that law can,  in an exhaustive  way, be studied from
the position  of the so-called  legal  insider.34 Instead,  different  perspectives
need  to complement  each  other  in order  to get  a grasp  of the complex
“discursive elements” where
“[n]orms and the ‘systems’ attributed to them are therefore not closed and
stable but intrinsically open and contingent.”35
From  this  theoretical  point  of departure,  the present  article  continues
to the more  specific  question  of the role  of the adversarial  principle  and
the tendencies toward settlement.
4. THE ADVERSARIAL PRINCIPLE WITHIN THE ODR 
FRAMEWORK
It  should  first  be  noted  that  the ODR framework  did  not  emanate  from
the field  of procedural  law  but  from  Article 169  TFEU  and  the aim
to promote the interests of consumers and ensure a high level of consumer
protection.
Nevertheless,  since  all  ODR  schemes  should  be  in accordance  with
the fundamental  rights  to an effective  remedy  and  to a fair  trial  under
Article 47 of ECFR, ODRs are also, of course, procedural in their nature.36
32 See,  e.g. Carnerio,  D.  et  al.  (2012)  Online  dispute  resolution:  an artificial  intelligence
perspective. Artificial Intelligence Review, 41, pp. 211–240, Zeleznikow, J. (2017) Can Artificial
Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution Enhance Efficiency and Effectivness In Courts.
International  Journal  For  Court  Administration, 8 (2),  pp. 30-45  and  Lodder,  A.  R.  (2006)
The Third Party  and Beyond.  An Analysis  of the Different Parties,  in particular  the Fifth,
Involved in Online Dispute Resolution. Information & Communications Technology Law, 15 (2),
pp. 143–155.
33 ODR Directive preamble § 26, ADR Directive preamble § 45.
34 Davies,  M.  (2010)  Legal  Pluralism.  In:  Peter  Cane and Herbert  Kritzer  (ed.).  The Oxford
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 805–827, 823, 816.
35 Op. cit., p. 823.
36 Regulation on consumer ODR, preamble § 26, Directive on consumer ADR, preamble § 45.
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Article 47 covers the scope of Article 6 and 13 of the ECHR. Although not
spelled  out  in the article,  the adversarial  principle  is  held  to be  part
of Article 6 of the ECHR.37 
Ordinary  civil  court  procedure  is  rooted  in the adversarial  principle,
which includes the idea of rational  negotiations between two parties  that
have equally strong arms at their disposal. The basic idea is that two parties
put  forth  their  interests,  evidence,  and  arguments  before  a neutral  third
party  in a rational  way  and  also  have  the opportunity  to criticize  and
debunk  the argumentation  of the other  party.  In this  way,  the parties,
in total, have incentives to put forth all facts necessary for the neutral third
party  to make  a ruling  in accordance  with  the relevant  substantive  law.
This,  of course,  is  never  the case  in real  court  or ADR  settings.  The idea
of two  equal  parties  is  in  most  situations  an illusion,  especially  within
the field  of consumer  litigation.38 In turn,  this  has  amounted  to political
reforms in court systems during the last 40 years where the weaker party is
supported in one way or another  in order to ensure  real  equality  of arms
between  the parties.  The weaker  party  is  supported  by arms  such
as financial support to afford a legal counsel, substantive case management
by the court,  a relieved burden of proof,  and special  courts for  consumer
disputes in order to level the playing field in the proceedings.
Although reforms  try  to achieve  “real”  equality  of arms,  and  thereby
efficient adversarial proceedings, the adversarial model remains criticized.
The main  point  of this  criticism  was  summarized  by Menkel-Meadow
in the mid-1990s.39 Menkel-Meadow claimed  that  the binary  positions
intrinsic  to the adversarial  model  polarize  debate  and  tort  the truth
by leaving  out  information.  The idea  of oppositional  presentation  of facts
only works when the actors involved in the process exhibit a genuine search
for  truth,  which  is  something  quite  different  than a genuine  will  to win
a case.40 The adversarial  model,  claims  Menkel-Meadow,  also  simplifies
complexity and obscures rather than clarifies. 
It is not controversial  to put forth that legal argumentation is situated
in a complex contingent discursive environment, as described above. Thus,
37 Danelius,  H.  (2012)  Mänskliga  rättigheter  i  europeisk  praxis:  En  kommentar  till
Europakonventionen om de mänskliga rättigheterna. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, p. 246–247.
38 See, e.g. Galanter, M. (1975) Afterword: Explaining Litigation,  Law & Society Review, 9 (2),
p. 347–368, 363. See also Lindblom, PH. (2017) Progressive Procedure. Uppsala: Iustus, p. 155f.
39 Menkel-Meadow,  C.  (1996)  The Trouble  With  the Adversary  System  in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World. William and Mary Law Review, 38 (5), pp. 5-44, 13.
40 Op. cit., p. 13.
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the procedural  order  of formulating  short  claims  and  precise  facts  is
delimiting the underlying conflict. To put it bluntly, the adversarial system
lacks a genuine search for the complexities of reality.
Furthermore, the adversarial system is built  upon the idea of positivist
objectivity and neutrality and therefore also assumes the idea of common
values  among  the parties  involved.41 Objectivity  and  neutrality  are
furthermore the values that often are put forth as definitions of “independent
and  impartial” (in Article 47  ECFR  and  Article 6  ECHR).  The idea
of a positivist  objectivity  (in a legal  context)  has  been  widely  criticized.42
Also the idea of a neutral  third party  has  been heavily  scrutinized,43 and
add to this the diverse legal and societal conditions within the EU. In sum,
there are several epistemological problems associated with the adversarial
principle (as the best tool for finding the facts of a complex reality).
The idea  of an “illusionary  balance”  between  the parties  is  non-
-controversial  to put  forth,  especially  in a consumer  litigation  context.
In fact, the illusionary balance can be regarded as the reason for this specific
field of law to exist in the first place. The imbalance between the parties has
led to different kinds of reforms in different kinds of proceedings in recent
decades.  It  is  common to call  out  the need for  competent  legal  expertise
(human  or non-human)  in order  to bring  equality  of arms to the parties.44
However,  it  has  been  claimed  by Menkel-Meadow  that  support  via  legal
expertise brings  skills concerning the procedure  per se, and not arguments
concerning the facts of the case. You win a case as a skilled lawyer and not
as a lawyer  who  brings  the relevant  facts.  But  it  should  not  be  skill but
argument,  say  the criticism  here  put  forth.  In sum,  the idea  of equality
of arms misses the target, as it does not necessarily focus on the underlying
conflict  and  therefore  does  not  necessarily  bring  stronger  enforcement
of consumer rights to the table.45
41 Op. cit., p. 8.
42 From e.g. both legal realists and from the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g. Bladini,
M. (2013) I objektivitetens sken: en kritisk granskning av objektivitetsideal, objektivitetsanspråk och
legitimeringsstrategier i diskurser om dömande i brottmål. Göteborg: Makadam, p. 89ff.
43 See  footnote  16  in Menkel-Meadow,  C.  (1996)  The Trouble  With  the Adversary  System
in a Postmodern, Multicultural World. William and Mary Law Review, 38 (5), p. 5–44.
44 See Article 47 of the ECFR.
45 See  also  Lewis concerning  small  case  litigants  without  counsel  and  their  difficulties
in understanding what kind of evidence is needed, Lewis, P. (2007) Litigants in Person and
Their  Difficulties  in Adducing  Evidence:  A Study  of Small  Claims  in an English  County
Court. International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 11, p. 24–48.
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With  this  said,  the present  article  does  not  advocate  the abolishment
of the adversarial  principle,  not  least  due  to the lack  of better  options.46
Nevertheless,  in line  with  the theoretical  understanding  presented above,
the effects  of the adversarial  model  must  be  taken  into  account  when
assessing  how  consumer  legislation  is  made  efficient  through  consumer
litigation. 
The institutional consequences of the adversarial principles within ODR
schemes will  now be discussed in more detail  in relation to the two ODR
entities  mentioned  above,  i.e. the Swedish  National  Board  for  Consumer
Disputes  (Allmänna  reklamationsnämnden,  ARN) and  the German  General
Consumer  Arbitration  Board,  Center  for  Mediation  (Allgemeine  Verbraucher-
-schlichtungsstell. Zentrum für Schlichtung, AVZS).
4.1. NATIONAL BOARD FOR CONSUMER DISPUTES (ARN)
The Swedish ODR entity  National  Board  for  Consumer Disputes  (ARN)  has
the manifest  task  of trying  disputes  that  arise  between  consumers  and
business  operators.  ARN  submits  recommendations  on how  disputes
should be resolved, e.g. it may decide/recommend that a product should be
repaired  by the company.  ARN's  recommendations  are  not  binding,  but
a majority  of Swedish  companies  follow  them.47 The inquiry  is  free
of charge for both the consumer and the business involved.
The activities of ARN are governed through legislation (“Instruction for
ARN”), where it is stated that ARN is an ADR entity according to the ADR
Directive.48 The instruction  also  proclaims  that  ARN  should  fulfil
the obligations that follow from the ODR regulation. However, so far, few
cases  are  brought  to ARN via  the ODR platform.  In 2017,  13  cases  were
initiated at ARN through the ODR platform (which can be compared with
the 14,000  cases  assessed  yearly  by ARN  when  national  cases  are
included).49
46 Although there are voices claiming that  “EU is not, at heart, an adversarial culture, but seeks
to build society based upon compromise and consensus” Hodges, C. (2016) Consumer Redress:
Implementing the Vision. In: Pablo Cortés (ed.). The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer
Dispute Resolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 351–368, 367.
47 National  Board  for  Consumer  Disputes  (Allmänna  Reklamationsnämnden).  (2017)
Årsredovisning (Annual Report) 2017, pp. 7, 11 and 21.
48 Förordning  (2015:739)  med  instruktion  för  Allmänna  reklamationsnämnden'.  (2015)
(Instruction for ARN).
49 National  Board  for  Consumer  Disputes  (Allmänna  Reklamationsnämnden).  (2017)
Årsredovisning (Annual Report) 2017, pp. 7 and 11.
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At first  sight,  it  seems  as if ARN  is  neither  adversarial  nor  friendly
toward settlements. However, when looking closer, it becomes evident that
the procedure  of preparing  the case  before  the Board follows  a clear
adversarial  model.  The procedure  (that  is  always  a written procedure)  is
initiated by a letter or an online form. If the matter is not rejected for formal
reasons,  ARN  asks  the company  to comment  on the consumer’s  claims.
The consumer  in turn  has  an opportunity  to see  and  comment
on the company's  response.  Both  parties  have  the right  to submit  written
evidence in the form of e.g. contracts or certificates of inspection.
The registration form instructs the consumer to describe a specific claim
and in a clear  way motivate the claim (and also provide  evidence).  After
a formal review, the company is invited to respond. When the company has
responded,  the consumer  has  the opportunity  to complement  the case.
At this stage, ARN could initiate a discussion in order to reach a settlement
between the parties.  If needed,  there  are  also  options  for  further  written
argumentation  from  the parties.50 If no  settlement  is  reached,  the case  is
assessed by the Board (at a meeting at which the parties are not present).51
The Board  consists  of a chairperson,  who  is  a lawyer  and  has  court
experience,  and  two  or four  other  members,  who  come  from  various
consumer  and  trade  organizations.  The decisions  of the Board  are  not
formally  binding  for  the company,  but  are  nevertheless  accepted
in a majority of cases. For example, in 2017, 79 percent of the decisions were
accepted by the company involved.52 The parties have no legal counsel but
are advised to seek support from the public advisors in consumer disputes
available online via the Swedish single point of Contents for Consumers.
4.2. GENERAL CONSUMER ARBITRATION BOARD, CENTER FOR
MEDIATION (AVZS)
The German General Consumer Arbitration Board Center for Mediation (AVZS)
is  officially  recognized  by the Federal  Office  of Justice  and  is  supported
by the extrajudicial  dispute  resolution  for  consumers  and  entrepreneurs
association.  The task  of the Arbitration  Board  is  to mediate  and  settle
disputes between companies and consumers in order to reach out-of-court
50 Instruction for ARN §§ 20–22.
51 National  Board  for  Consumer  Disputes  (Allmänna  Reklamationsnämnden).  (2017)
Årsredovisning (Annual Report) 2017, p. 5.
52 Op. cit., p. 21.
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solutions.53 AVZS  is  governed  by the German  Act  on Alternative  Dispute
Resolution  in Consumer  Matters,  which  implements  the ADR  Directive. 54
The German  legislation  applies  to both  private  and  public  ADR  entities
recognized under this Act.55 The AVZS received 2,125 applications in 2017,
101 of which came via the ODR platform.56
Even though AVZS is more focused on settlements compared with ARN,
it  nevertheless  also  follows  an adversarial  model.  The procedure  should
only take into account the outspoken interests of the parties.57 It also follows
from  the AVZS  rules  of procedure  that  prior  to the intervention
by the arbitration board, the applicant must clearly formulate the contested
claim against  the respondent.58 According  to § 4  of the same document,  it
follows  that  the procedure  is  initiated  by one  of the parties  which  needs
to describe  the subject  and  interests  at stake,  and  that  the defendant
thereafter is given an opportunity to respond. This phase can be conducted
in writing,  online,  by telephone,  or through  direct  personal  conversation.
The dispute  resolution  procedure  ends  by either  a successful  agreement
or a declaration that the procedure has failed.59
The mediations  are  performed  by certified  mediators  according
to mediation  law  or by full-time  lawyers  with  judge  qualifications.
The mediators  have  the objective  of working  “impartially  and
independently”,60 and  may  submit  a settlement  proposal  to the consumers
if there  are  no  results  in the initial  negotiations  for  a settlement,  yet
the proposal is not binding on the parties. Following the ADR Directive and
ODR Regulation, the AVZS Rules of Procedure state that the proposal must be
based on the situation arising from the dispute settlement procedure,  and
that  it  should  be  aligned  with  applicable  law  and  comply  with
the mandatory consumer protection laws.61
53 AVZS website (2019). [online] Available from: https://www.streitbeilegungsstelle.org/ueber-
uns/streitbeilegungsstelle/ [Accessed 11 mars 2019].
54 AVZS Rules of Procedure (Verfahrensordnung) § 8.
55 Gesetz  uber  die  alternative  Streitbeilegung  in Verbrauchersachen –  Verbraucher-
-streitbeilegungsgesetz (Act on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Consumer Matters), § 1.
56 General Consumer Arbitration Board Center For Mediation Activity Report 2018, pp. 2, 4.
57 Op. cit., § 3 (3).
58 Op. cit., § 4 (2).
59 AVZS website  (2019).  [online]  Available  from https://www.streitbeilegungsstelle.org/das-
verfahren/verfahrensordnung-ablauf/ [Accessed 11 March 2019]
60 AVZS website (2019). [online] Available from https://www.streitbeilegungsstelle.org/ueber-
uns/streitmittler/ [Accessed 11 March 2019].
61 AVZS Rules of Procedure (Verfahrensordnung) § 8.
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4.3.  INITIAL  REMARKS  ON THE ROLE  OF THE ADVERSARIAL
PRINCIPLE FOR ARN AND AVZS
Both  ARN  and  AVZS  comprise  the features  that  the criticism
of the adversarial  model  targets,  namely  that  the situation  is  framed
by the claim presented by the consumer, and that the process of formulating
the facts  of the case  is  done  through a back-and-forth written proceeding
where  the third  party  (competent  in consumer  legislation)  is  passive.
The Board, which represents the third neutral party, but also the party with
the competence  to safeguard  consumer  rights,  becomes  involved  when
the dispute has already been framed by the parties. An interesting question
to ask  is  whether  it  is  possible  to safeguard  consumer  rights  without
safeguarding  which  facts  enter  the proceedings.  The case  law  from
the CJEU  seems  to,  at least  to some  extent,  point  in the direction  that
national courts should be active also in, ex officio, investigating relevant facts
in consumer cases.62
Compared  with  ARN,  AVZS  is  more  focused  on finding  a friendly
resolution, and no decision is given by the ODR entity without consent from
both  parties.  Nevertheless,  if the dispute  mediator  has  made  a proposal
to the parties  to resolve  the dispute  under  the rules  of procedure,  this
proposal must be based on the facts resulting from the dispute resolution
procedure.  Furthermore,  both  ARN’s  and  AVZS’s  websites  inform
the parties that the ODR entities are not consumer protection organizations
and do not unilaterally represent interests. They offer no legal advice and
therefore represent neither companies nor consumers.63 Instead, they serve
as a neutral  mediator  between  the parties.  The paradoxical  pluralistic
mission,  integral  to ODR,  here  becomes  obvious.  ARN  and  AVZS  are
supposedly neutral third parties (adversarial model) and at the same time
actors  obligated  to uphold  consumer  protection  (ADR  Directive,  § 1).
In the light  of the ODR  schemes  described  above,  the view  put  forth
by Menkel-Meadow  that the adversarial principle tends to find its way into
all  kinds  of legal  procedure  rings  true,  also  for  consumer  redress  ADR,
online or not. The role of both acting as a neutral third party and defender
of individual consumer rights is indeed challenging. And the situation will
62 See Section 2 above.
63 AVZS website (2019). [online] Available from https://www.verbraucher-schlichter.de/ueber-
uns/verbraucherschlichtungsstelle [Accessed 11 March 2019]. The same principle is noted
on the ARN’s website: https://www.arn.se/ [Accessed 11 March 2019].
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become  even  more  complex  when  we  add  the tendencies  toward
settlements.
5. TENDENCIES TOWARD SETTLEMENT
The trend toward an increasing number of settlements is  not only a trend
within ADR (including ODR), but also within all kinds of civil procedure.64
Settlements promise possibilities to achieve quick solutions, which is held
as a value  on its  own  regard.65 Nevertheless,  similar  to the adversarial
principle, settlements, too, have institutional and procedural consequences
that have been highlighted in the legal literature.
Already  in the 1980s,  Owen  Fiss  formulated  a quite  elegant  critique
of settlements.  The critique  implicates  that  settlements  are
counterproductive in relation to the substantial law that the case concerns.
The parties  bypass  the consumer  litigation  and  instead  agree  on a sum
of money to be paid in compensation, an agreement that replaces concrete
application  of the law.  Of course,  the settlement  negotiations  are  not
unrelated to the substantial law, but the point is  that the process becomes
more about assessment of e.g. risks, time delay, procedural costs etc. and
less  about  finding  facts  in the case  and matching  them with  substantive
consumer rights.66
Within  the field  of ODR,  Eidenmüller  and  Engel  have  warned  against
“false settlements”. They argue that
“mandatory consumer protection rights  attempt to correct market  failure.
Hence, enforcing these rights should not be returned to the market.”67
64 “Settlement  euphoria”.  Eidenmüller,  H.  and  Engel,  M.  (2014)  Against  False  Settlement:
Designing Efficient Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe.  Ohio  State  Journal
on Dispute Resolution, 29 (2), pp. 261–298, 263.
65 Cortés, P. (2014) Online Dispute Resolutions Services: A Selected Number of Case Studies.
Computer  and  Telecommunications  Law  Review, 6,  pp. 172–178,  172  and  Cortés,  P.  (2016)
The New  Landscape  of Consumer  Redress:  The European  Directive  on Consumer
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution. In: Pablo
Cortés (ed.). The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 17–41, 35.
66 See Wagner, G. (2014) Private Law Enforcement Through ADR: Wonder Drug Or Snake Oil.
Common Market Law Review, 51, pp. 165–194, 176. See also Eidenmüller, H. and Engel, M.
(2014) Against False Settlement: Designing Efficient Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems
in Europe.  Ohio  State  Journal  on Dispute Resolution, 29 (2),  pp. 261–298, 281 and Weiss,  R.
(2006)  Some  Economic  Musings  on Cybersettle.  University  of Toledo  Law  Review, 38,
pp. 89–99, 95ff.
67 Eidenmüller,  H.  and  Engel,  M.  (2014)  Against  False  Settlement:  Designing  Efficient
Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe.  Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution,
29 (2), pp. 261–298, 263.
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In addition  to  this,  there  are  concerns  that  300  ODR  entities  will  result
in a fragmentation  of decisions,  which  will  make  it  difficult  to uphold
consistent  consumer  law  application  throughout  the EU.68 De  Paolo  and
Canessa highlight  that  lawyers  and  parties  tend  to take  the path  of least
resistance.69 If consumer  rights  are  to be  protected,  they  need  to be
accompanied with smooth institutional structures. However, dealing with
cross-border cases, the situation is often quite the opposite. Few consumers
will  consider  suing a company for a faulty object worth 100 euro in their
own city,  and even less  so if the company is  seated in another  country.70
Furthermore,  very  few  consumers  will  risk  a proposed  50/50  settlement
when  faced  with  the risk  of having  to engage  in a lengthy  process  with
the potential  outcome  of getting  nothing.  The ADR  Directive  and  ODR
Regulation are clear on the point that ODR should not deny the consumer’s
right of access to court. However,  Eidenmüller and Engel  point out that it is
very unlikely that a consumer will continue to court if an “expert” (the ADR
Board/mediator)  already  has  stated  that  the consumer  has  no  case.
The formal right of “access to court” is one thing; the institutional potential
to make that right effective is another.71
Consumer  legislation,  formulated  as individual  rights,  is  often
mandatory  in the sense  that  the consumer  is  prohibited  to refrain  from
the exercising the right.  The logic behind this is  that consumer protection
legislation  is  in place  in order  to defend  consumers  from  the influence
of business owners. Opening up for individuals to refrain from their right
would  reduce  the level  of protection.  In relation  to this  logic  within
the substantive law, it is a bit paradoxical that individual consumers, taking
part  of the ODR procedure,  are  trusted  to accept  settlements  and  decide
which facts and arguments to bring to the table, when they at the same time
are  not,  in many  regards,  deemed  suitable  to negotiate  the terms
of a consumer  purchase.72 With  this  being  said,  consumer  rights  are  not
68 See Wagner, G. (2014) Private Law Enforcement Through ADR: Wonder Drug Or Snake Oil.
Common Market Law Review, 51, pp. 165–194, 171ff.
69 De Paolo, G. and Canessa, R. (2016) New Trends for ADR in the European Union. In: Pablo
Cortés (ed.). The New Regulatory Framework For Consumer Dispute Resolution. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 407–426, 425.
70 Eidenmüller,  H.  and  Engel,  M.  (2014)  Against  False  Settlement:  Designing  Efficient
Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe.  Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution,
29 (2), pp. 261–298, 268.
71 Op. cit., p. 293.
72 Although this is exactly the point made by CJEU in the case law cited above, namely that
the court  ex  officio  should  provide  consumers  with  information  on which  facts  to bring
to the case.
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the only  dimensions  of conflict  of importance  to consumers.73 The point
being  made  here  is  merely  that  the paradoxical  dimension  of consumer
redress, where consumers are autonomous and not autonomous at the same
time, is part of the institutional landscape.
So far,  a very  small  share  of consumer-company  conflict  reaches
the ODR  framework.  The European  Commission  has  been  monitoring  and
gathering information on ODR entities since the launch in 2016. In a report
from  2017,  an analysis  was  made  of a complete  dataset  related  to all
complaints  logged on the platform from 15 February 2016 to 15 February
2017. The analysis focused solely on complaints that were generated within
the platform’s  workflow  and  did  not  take  into  consideration  complaints
received by ADR entities directly, i.e. outside the platform.74
During  the 12  months  monitored  by the Commission,  some 1.9  million
people  visited  the platform  and  more  than  24,000  complaints  were
submitted  on the platform  in its  first  year  of operation.75 However,
85 percent  of the complaints  were  automatically  closed  within  30  days
of submission due to the deadline  for the consumer and business  to agree
on a competent ADR body. In order to understand the significance of these
data  and  evaluate  the interest  of companies  in ADR  procedures,
the Commission carried out a specific survey to get feedback from consumers
whose cases were automatically closed. The survey revealed that, although
a large  number  of businesses  did  not  follow  through  using  the ODR
platform, 40 percent of consumers who submitted a complaint on the ODR
platform that was automatically closed after 30 days had been contacted
directly  by the company  to solve  the problem  without  any  further
progression of the complaint  on the platform.  Hence,  the ODR framework
may lead to more case resolutions than the statistics show.76 Nine percent
of the complaints submitted via the ODR platform were not automatically
73 See Hodges, C. (2016) Consumer Redress: Implementing the Vision. In: Pablo Cortés (ed.).
The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 351–368, 358.
74 European  Commission.  (2017)  Report  from  the Commission  to the European  Parliament
and  the Council  on the functioning  of the European  Online  Dispute  Resolution  platform
established under Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer
disputes COM(2017) 744 final', (2017).
75 Op. cit., p. 4.
76 There are also technical reasons for the businesses’ lack of responsiveness on the platform.
For example,  when a complaint  is  against  a business  is  submitted for  the first  time and
the business  is  not  yet  registered  on the platform,  the automatic  notification  may  reach
an incorrect  email  address.  Other  reasons  could  be  that  the origin  of the notification
message is unclear to the business or that the notification ends up in the businesses’ email
spam folder and remains unread. Op. cit., p. 6.
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closed  by the system  but  were  refused  by the company.  Furthermore,
in many of these cases, the respective businesses indicated that they made
direct  contact  with  the consumer  and  solved  the issue  or were  planning
to do so. For 4 percent of the submitted complaints,  the data showed that
both parties had used the possibility to withdraw from the procedure before
their agreement to use a specific ADR body.77
Only 2 percent of the complaints were submitted to a specific ADR body.
In around half of these cases, the ADR bodies refused to deal with the case
on procedural grounds such as lack of competence or the consumer’s failure
to attempt to contact the business first. In some instances, either consumers
or businesses  withdrew  from  the procedure  before  it  was  completed.
In the end, ADR procedure reached a final outcome in less than 1 percent
of the 24,000  cases  submitted  via  the platform,  i.e. a couple  of hundred
cases.78 
On the other hand, the Commission states that 44 percent of the submitted
cases were settled bilaterally outside  the platform.79 All in all,  this means
that  a large  part  of the cases  processed  via  the ODR  platform  reach
settlements.  This  also  means  that  a very  limited  share  of consumer-
-company conflicts result in the application of consumer legislation on facts
of the case, in a court application sense.
Let us now consider settlement more closely in relation to the two ODR
entity examples.
5.1. THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR CONSUMER DISPUTES (ARN)
ARN is not an ODR designed to settle cases. Instead, as mentioned above,
the main  route  of the procedure  is  for  the Board  to finalize  a written
recommendation.  Nevertheless,  current trends toward efficiency have led
to reforms, and since 2016 ARN has been obliged to make efforts in order
for  the parties  to reach  a settlement.  According  to § 3  and  § 22
of the instruction for  ARN,  the Board  should try to encourage a settlement
between the parties.80 
A report from the parliamentary ombudsmen in Sweden (JO) states that
ARN,  during  a trial  period  conducted  conciliation  talks  by telephone
77 Ibid.
78 Op. cit., p. 7.
79 Ibid.
80 Förordning  (2015:739)  med  instruktion  för  Allmänna  reklamationsnämnden'.  (2015)
(Instruction for ARN) 3 § and 22 §.
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(in order to reach settlements) and measured among other things the time
they spent  on the conversation.  During  the evaluation,  it  was  found  that
the ARN staff  had managed to reconcile  the parties  in a majority of cases,
but  that  the conciliation  talks  took  a lot  of time.  The staff  were  therefore
advised not to raise the issue of conciliation in all  cases,  but only in cases
where time could be saved.81 The reason for considering a settlement could
therefore be said to concern cost efficiency for ARN, not other normative
values  connected  to consumer  protection.82 Hence,  the reason  for
settlements  concerns  the efficiency  of ARN  as an organization  trying
to increase  its  efficiency  in achieving  resolutions.  The possible  distinction
between  a settlement  and  an assessment  of facts  under  relevant
(mandatory) consumer legislation was not discussed in the report. In 2017,
22 percent of the cases brought to ARN reached a settlement and therefore
did  not  end  up  in a written  decision  from  the Board.  This  should  be
compared  with  the 37  percent  of the cases  that  actually  resulted
in a decision by the Board.83 
In sum,  although  the basic  design  of ARN  points  toward  a decision
by the Board,  a fifth  of the cases  are  resolved through settlements.  This  is
a relatively high number considering that only 37 percent of the cases end
up with a substantive decision.
5.2. GENERAL CONSUMER ARBITRATION BOARD, CENTER FOR
MEDIATION (AVZS)
As mentioned  above,  it  follows  from  the AVZS  website  that  it  is  not
a consumer  protection  organization.  Furthermore,  AVZS  offers  no  legal
advice and therefore represents neither companies nor consumers. Instead,
it  serves  as a neutral  mediator  between  the parties.  Nevertheless,
if the mediation  does  not  lead  to an amicable  solution,  the Board  submits
an arbitration  proposal  accompanied  with  reasons  for  the proposal.
81 Justitieombudsmannen,  'Dnr  6398-2017 –  Inspektion  av Allmänna  reklamations
nämnden (ARN) den 23–24 oktober 2017 (Parlimentary Ombudsmen, Inspection of ARN
23–24 oktober 2017), p. 4.
82 See  National  Board  for  Consumer  Disputes  (Allmänna  Reklamationsnämnden).  (2017)
Årsredovisning (Annual Report) 2017, p. 10.
83 Förordning  (2015:739)  med  instruktion  för  Allmänna  reklamationsnämnden'  (2015).
(Instruction for  ARN) 3  § and 22  §.  National  Board for  Consumer  Disputes  (Allmänna
Reklamationsnämnden). (2017) Årsredovisning (Annual Report) 2017, p. 6 (when cases where
the company has not responded are included, this number rises to 47 percent for the year
2017, p. 15).
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The Board  must  also  inform  the parties  of the possibility  of not  accepting
the deal and instead having the option to turn to a court.84
According  to the activity  report  for  2018,  1,993  of 2,125  cases  were
finished at AVZS.85 All of these cases were not settled since also cases that
were  withdrawn  were  counted  as finished.  Overall,  1,376  cases  were
unsuccessful  in the sense  that  no  agreement  was  reached  between
the parties.  Of these,  1,171  were  unsuccessful  in this  way  because
the defendant  did  not  get  involved  in the procedure.  Furthermore,
197 applications  were  withdrawn  by the applicant.86 When  excluding
the number  of rejected  cases  (396),  the agreement  rate  for  2017  ends  up
being 13.84 percent, which means that 221 cases were settled.  87 There is no
information  in the report  concerning  the underlying  reasons  in order  for
the parties to reach a settlement.
5.3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING 
THE TENDENCIES TOWARD SETTLEMENT
The statistics  from the Commission report  and  the figures  from ARN and
AVZS paint  a picture  of settlements  being  very  common.  Also  for  ARN,
a body where the main path of procedure does not lead to settlements, they
are still very common. Although there are no statistics from ARN, AVZS,
and the Commission,  it  is  not  very  farfetched to assume,  following  Weiss,
Wagner,  Eidenmüller and Engel, that a large share of the settlements are not
based on consumer regulation considerations, but rather on considerations
of costs, risks, and quick resolutions to the conflicts at hand.88 The examples
from ARN also indicate that the ODR entity involves a cost benefit analysis
concerning when to pursue a settlement and when not to. The normative
difference  between  a settlement  and  an assessment  of the facts  in a case
does not  seem to be an issue of concern. The two types of resolutions are
treated  as interchangeable.  The lack  of discussion  or distinction  between
a settlement, a reasoned proposal, and an assessment of the facts in a case,
84 AVZS Rules of Procedure (Verfahrensordnung) § 8 (3).
85 General Consumer Arbitration Board Center For Mediation Activity Report 2018, p. 2.
86 Op. cit., p. 7.
87 Op. cit., p. 8.
88 Weiss, R. (2006) Some Economic Musings on Cybersettle, University of Toledo Law Review, 38,
p. 89–99,  Wagner,  G.  (2014)  Private  Law  Enforcement  Through  ADR:  Wonder  Drug
Or Snake Oil. Common Market Law Review, 51, pp. 165–194 and Eidenmüller, H. & Engel, M.
(2014) Against False Settlement: Designing Efficient Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems
in Europe. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 29 (2), pp. 261–298.
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in the Commission report, and in the information provided by ARN or AVZS
is  interesting  considering  that  resolving  a conflict  to avoid  time-delay
or to avert risks is something quite different than applying a legal right.
6. PROCEDURAL TRANSFORMATION WITHIN ODR 
SCHEMES
This article has focused on two specific procedural considerations regarding
ODR:  the adversarial  principle  and  tendencies  toward  settlements.
The reasoning  is  rooted  in the idea  that  in order  to understand
the consequences of the ADR and ODR initiatives, we need to understand
the procedural  mechanisms that  contribute  to the enforcement  of the legal
norms at stake.
An obvious starting point for this discussion is to put forth that to settle
is  to do  something  other  than  enforce  a consumer  right.  There  is  quite
a different  normative  process  involved.  Instead  of matching  substantive
norms to facts, the parties are involved in a negotiation based on economic
rationale. However, the distinction between different kinds of resolutions is
not  visible  in the official  reports  concerning ODR. As already mentioned,
the ODR platform has the twofold objective  of promoting  both consumer
protection and the internal market. A distinction between resolving a case
based  on the application  of legal  rights,  and  resolving  a case  based
on the broader  considerations  involved  in settlements  is  central
to the objective of promoting consumer protection, but it is not as relevant
in relation the growth of the EU economy. Since consumer transactions add
up to a large part of the EU’s gross domestic product, there is considerable
economic  interest  in making  the consumer  market  as efficient  as possible.
The lack  of distinction  between  applications  of norms  and  resolutions
on other  grounds  makes  sense  only  in relation  the objective  of the ODR
framework to promote cross-border trade. Conflicts need to be resolved for
the market to function, but the normative basis for such resolutions is not
that important. The economic efficiency is calculated at an aggregated level,
which is  quite an opposite starting point  compared with individual legal
rights,  and  the prime  aim  is  resolutions.  From  this  perspective,
the consumers  become  a mass,  a collective,  that  is  weighed  against
an abstract  economic  interest  of the companies  to strike  a balance  with
positive  effects  on the internal  market.  The possibilities  to find  efficient
consideration  toward  consumers,  on an aggregated  scale,  is  further
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strengthened by the possibilities to access data due to the digital dimension
of ODR.89 Or as expressed by Eidenmüller and Engel:
“mandatory consumer protection rights attempt to correct market failure.”90
In other words, the focus on settlements (and the adversarial model) could
be  said  to build  a system  around  economic  rationale  in order  to support
the system as such making the objective of economic growth primary and
the objective  of enforcing  (individual)  consumer  rights  secondary.  From
what  seems  (at least  at a first  glance)  to be  the opposite  perspective,
the signals  from the CJEU, i.e. that  court officials  around EU should take
active  steps  to ensure  individual  consumer  rights,  paint  quite  a different
picture. 
Furthermore, the ADR Directive Article 11 stresses that there must be no
infringements  of mandatory  consumer  law.  These  concerns  have  led
to raised  voices  for  the need  for  individual  assessments  based
on an adversarial  model that  ensures  access  to courts in a fair  trial  where
the parties  have  equal  arms.91 Nevertheless,  if ODR is  seen  as something
that becomes when legal decisions are made (rather than as a fixed field
of law open to doctrinal studies), then it should be considered that in many
cases, no resolutions seem to take place at all. After all, the statistics show
that  less than 1 percent  of the cases  submitted to an ODR platform reach
some  sort  of a substantive  assessment.  In this  institutional  landscape
(a landscape of an almost non-existent formal consumer redress), there are
calls  for  quick  and  flexible  routes  to ensure  just  conflict  resolutions
to consumers.  This  is  where  settlements  enter  the stage.  But  once  again,
quite  interestingly,  the potential  problems  arising  from  too  many
settlements are leading to a renewed call for more strict adversarial models
of conflict  resolution,  as the adversarial  process  is  seen  as strengthening
access  to justice.92 Therefore,  considering  the risk  for  settlements  on non-
-legitimate  grounds,  adversarial  models  are  called  for  to safeguard
89 Concerning this,  see Weiss, R. (2006) Some Economic Musings on Cybersettle.  University
of Toledo  Law  Review, 38,  p.  89–99,  96  and  Cortés,  P.  (2017b)  The Online  Court:  Filling
the Gaps of the Civil Justice System? Civil Justice Quarterly, 36 (1), pp. 109–126, 173.
90 Eidenmüller, H. & Engel, M. (2014) Against False Settlement: Designing Efficient Consumer
Rights  Enforcement  Systems  in Europe.  Ohio  State  Journal  on Dispute  Resolution, 29 (2),
pp. 261–298, 263.
91 See, e.g. Eidenmüller, H. & Engel, M. (2014) Against False Settlement: Designing Efficient
Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe.  Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution,
29 (2), pp. 261–298, 269.
92 Ibid.
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individual  rights.  And,  vice  versa,  when  the adversarial  model  makes
processes slow and complicated, settlements offer the necessary quick and
flexible routes to ensure just conflict resolutions to consumers.93 In this way,
the adversarial  model  and  settlements  promise  solutions  to each  other’s
problems in a paradoxical manner.
This article concludes in this contradictory notion with no clear answers
on how  to strike  the best  balance  for ODR  schemes.  Taking  a pluralistic
approach, it is clear that the complex reality of consumer redress gives rise
to different kinds of problems at different levels depending on how we go
about conflict resolution. Consumer redress through the ODR platform will
transform  consumer  conflicts  (as all  legal  institutions  do).  This
transformation  is  an integral  part  of law.  “Resolution”  is  not  the same
in a settlement compared to an application of norms to facts.  Furthermore,
a settlement  based  on an individual  assessment  is  not  the same
as a settlement where the mediator has access to aggregated data on typical
consumer  behavior.  Lastly,  a presentation  of a case  channeled  through
an adversarial model is not the same as a presentation of a case channeled
through  ex  officio  action  by an investigating  authority.  Further  research
in this  field  is  called  for  in order  to understand  the special  and  varying
implications  of procedural  principles  surrounding  consumer  protection
within ODR.
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